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The world's population has grown rapidly from about 2.5 billion in
1950 to a current size of about 5.8 billion. Most of the increase has
been recorded in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America due to continued high fertility in the face of reductions in
levels of mortality. These three continents are projected to have a total
of 5.1 billion people by the year 2000 (United Nations 1990; UNFPA
1993), about 81 percent of the world's population. This share is projected
to increase in the first half of the twenty-first century as a result of relatively high fertility rates and the impact of population momentum.
Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to have a population of 1.32 billion
in the year 2025, which represents 15.6 percent of the projected world
population (United Nations 1995). This rapid increase in population size
is expected to put tremendous pressure on the meager resources available to governments in the region and to contribute to the further deterioration of the economic performance of the countries concerned.
Currently, the rate of population growth in sub-Saharan Africa is
3.0 percent per year; this exceeds the growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) in a majority of the countries. This discrepancy has
led to a rapid increase in the proportion of the population living in
poverty. Although there are indications of fertility decline in a few
countries (for example, Botswana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe), the levels
are still high in most countries, above 6 children per woman on
average, and contraceptive prevalence rates are low. The political
commitment to measures geared to reduce population growth is inadequate in most countries on the continent.
Kenya provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of various policy options on future population growth. Five population censuses have been carried out in the country since 1948. Several demographic surveys, including the most recent Demographic and Health
Surveys (NCPD 1989, 1994), have been undertaken. The data collected
in the various censuses have documented a rapid increase in population
from 5.4 million in 1948 to 21.4 million in 1989, and in the population
growth rate from 2.5 percent per year in 1948 to a peak of 3.8 percent in
1979 and 3.4 percent in 1989 (see Table 1). The major contributing factors to these trends have been a significant increase in fertility during the
period 1948-79 and large declines in mortality, particularly among infants and children. The total fertility rate increased from 6.0 in 1948 to
7.9 in 1979. The 1989 and 1993 Demographic and Health Surveys indicate that the total fertility rate has declined to 6.7 in 1989 and 5.4 in
1993 (Cross et al. 1991; Kelley and Nobbe 1990). The crude death rate
has also declined from 25 per 1,000 in 1948 to 10 per 1,000 in 1994.

Table 1 Trends in demographic indicators for Kenya, 1948-94
1962
census

1948
census

Total fertility rate
.
(per woman)

8.6
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5.4

Population (millions)
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6.0
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Crude death rate
(per 1,000)

Population growth rate
(percent per year)
Infant mortality rate
(per 1,000)
Life expectancy (years)

1979
census

10.9

16.1
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7.9

6.8
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NA

118

104

66

35

44
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54

57
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NA = not available
a Estimate from the 1993 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey.
Source: Government of Kenya Population Census Reports.
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The rapid increase in population size has posed diverse socioeconomic challenges to the Kenyan Government. The provision of basic
needs health, education, housing, employment opportunities, and
food has drastically deteriorated, especially since 1980. The rate of
urbanization has significantly increased without appropriate enhancement of the requisite social amenities and employment opportunities.
The negative consequences of urbanization include social decadence,
growth in slums, and crime. Environmental degradation has continued unabated: the country has experienced destruction of water
catchment areas, soil erosion, and encroachment of the desert on the
fragile semi-arid areas.

Objectives of the Study
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The primary objective of this study is to measure the impact of different causes of continued population growth on Kenya's future size and
to formulate appropriate policy measures to minimize the adverse socioeconomic consequences of population growth. In general, continued
population growth is the consequence of three factors: (1) unwanted
fertility, (2) high desired family size, and (3) population momentum.

The ongoing fertility transition in Kenya, though highly welcome,
will not necessarily lead to stabilization of the population in the short
term, unless appropriate policies and programs are implemented to
address all three of these causes of population growth.
This study first briefly reviews population policies pursued by the
Kenyan Government since the formulation of the first such policy in
1967. Next, projections made by the World Bank and the United Nations are summarized, and a new set of projections is presented to
highlight the contributions of the different causes of future growth.
The study concludes with policy implications emanating from this
analysis.

Population Policy Since 1967 and Its Impact
Kenya was the first sub-Saharan country to formulate a population
policy. The initial 1967 policy emphasized the reduction of the rate of
population growth by reducing fertility. Its successful implementation
was at first inhibited by inadequate political support, pronatalist attitudes evident in the high desired family sizes of the population (Dow
and Werner 1983; CBS 1980), and poor implementation of the family
planning program, which was the backbone of the policy (Mauldin
and Ross 1991). Contrary to expectations, the period 1967 to 1980
witnessed an increase in fertility and the population growth rate, as
documented in Table 1. According to many observers, the policy had
failed.
The policy was extensively revised in 1984 (NCPD 1984), when
the government concluded that concerted efforts had to be made to
reduce the rate of population growth as a step toward promoting economic progress. Like the previous one, this policy had fertility reduction as its first priority. In addition, it emphasized socioeconomic
development strategies (mainly enhancement of the education of
women and their participation in formal employment), involvement
of men and youth, and collaboration between the government and
nongovernmental organizations in policy implementation.
As indicated earlier, fertility has begun to decline. Desired family size
has also been drastically reduced from 7.3 children in 1979 to 5.8 in 1989
and 3.7 in 1993. The contraceptive prevalence rate has significantly increased from 7 percent in 1979 to 27 percent in 1989 and 33 percent in
1993. These trends in fertility levels and contraceptive use indicate improvements in policy implementation, but the level of unmet need for
family planning services remains high: in 1993, 36 percent of currently

married women were not practicing contraception, despite a desire not
; - : ,... . •,,
. ,. ,, : .-, .< .....
., ..
.
.
to get pregnant.

Population Projections
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The most recent projections by the United Nations (1995) and the
World Bank (Bos et al. 1994) are presented in Table 2. The two projec
tions differ widely for the year 2025 and especially for 2050 (92 million
vs. 60 million). The principal reason for these differences is that the
World Bank takes into account the findings of the 1993 Kenya Demo7
graphic and Health Survey, which indicated a sharp decline in fertility
(to a TFR of 5.4), and assumes rapid fertility declines to the replace
ment level by 2015; in contrast, the UN starts from a higher level of
fertility in 1990-95 and assumes that fertility will decline more gradu
ally, reaching the replacement level only by 2030. The UN also as
sumes a significantly more rapid improvement in life expectancy over
the next several decades.
Table 2 Projections of the population of Kenya by the
United Nations and the World Bank
Year

United Nations

1990
2000

23,613,000

:,' '

32,577,000

'""*•

• ••,.'''-••.•-

2025

63,360,000

2050

92,194,000

World Bank
••.•:"..

' :V""
1

24,160,000
31,409,000
47,393,000
60,317,000

Sources: United Nations (1995) (revised estimates); Bos et al. (1994).

Alternative Population Projections and the
Causes of Population Growth

;

I have made three new projections to assess the separate contribu
tions of unwanted fertility, high desired family size, and population
momentum. All projections start in 1990 with a population total es
, , .., _ -: .
.
timated at 21.9 million.

Assumptions

.

:
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The first projection, labeled the "standard scenario," assumes a total
fertility rate of 5.4 between 1990 and 1995 (based on the 1993 Kenya

Demographic and Health Survey) and replacement fertility beginning
in 2015. Mortality assumptions are the same as those used in the cur
rent World Bank projection because they appear plausible and incor
porate a moderate effect of the AIDS pandemic on the projected
population. Although this series is essentially the same as the World
Bank's, the Bank series starts with a total population of 24.2 million
in 1990 instead of 21.9 million.
The second projection is the same as the standard scenario except
that all unwanted fertility is removed from 1995 onward. In all peri
ods after 1995, this projection sets the total fertility rate equal to the
wanted fertility level, which was estimated at 3.4 in 1990—95 and is
assumed to decline to replacement level beginning in 2015. This pro
jection is labeled the "wanted scenario."
The third projection assumes immediate reduction of fertility to
replacement level (NRR = 1; TFR = 2.4) starting in 1995. This set
provides the lowest projected figures and is labeled the "replacement
scenario." These three series permit the decomposition of the total
projected population into the contributions made by the three causes
of population growth.

Results
Table 3, Figure 1, and Appendixes 1-3 show the projected population
for the three scenarios. The figures indicate substantial disparities
among the scenarios. It is projected that by 2050 Kenya will have a
population of 54 million in the standard scenario, 47 million if the ef
fect of unwanted fertility is eliminated completely, and 45 million if the
impact of high desired fertility is eliminated as well. The replacement
scenario estimates population momentum. The implied estimates of
the total fertility rate in each scenario are presented in Table 4.
As documented in Appendixes 2 and 3, the primary school-going
population is projected to increase from 5.8 million in 1990 to about
7.5 million by the year 2005, before gradually declining to 6.9 million
by 2050. The labor force is projected to increase sharply from 10.7 mil
lion in 1990 to about 36.5 million by 2050. The rapid increase in the size
of the school-going population and the labor force is expected to com
pound the pressures on future socioeconomic development.
Table 5 documents the contributions of the different causes to the
total size of the population between 1995 and 2050. The difference
between the standard and wanted projections gives the contribution
of unwanted fertility; the difference between the wanted and re-

Table 3 Projected population of Kenya to 2050:
Standard, wanted, and replacement scenarios
Year

Standard

Wanted

1990

21,900,764

21,900,764

21,900,764

1995

25,419,851

25,419,851

... 25,419,85 !.,->.

28,854,960

27,006,402

26,883,869 .r>

32,066,045

29,351,001

28,757,235

35,039,265

31,825,008

37,636,311

34/245,804

40,384,363

36,552,405

2025

43,172,230

38,676,538

37,640,924

2030

45,827,473

40,639,350

39,422,523

2035

48,195,038

42,384,655

40,992,950

2040

50,372,198

44,027,986

42,476,162

2045

52,303,224

45,454,314

43,765,102

2050

54,177,321

46,791,729

44,985,304

2000

*

2005

'

'

2010

,

2015

;

2020

-Replacement

J

' 30,977,053 ;

"

33,364,435
.-=

35,629,324

Figure 1 Standard projection of the population of Kenya
to 2050 and amounts attributable to each of three causes
Causes of population growth
54.2_
50

Standard
projection
c
o

I

I) Unwanted fertility
.__
* 2) High desired family size

40

3) Population momentum

1995
30

P,

o

_.„

20

10

0

1950

2000
Year

2050

Table 4 Estimates of the total fertility rate implied in each
projection scenario, by five-year period, 1990-2020"
Period

Standard

Wanted

Replacement

1990-1995

5.40

5.40

5.40

3.10 , -..,:•-,.
.- "
2.83

2.43
2.42

2.56

2.36

1995-2000
2000-2005
2005-2010

•
:

•-••

:
'

..

4.45
3.64

.

.

'

2.97

•""'•'

:'

"

2010-2015

2.42

2.35

2.32

2015-2020

2.28

2.29

2.29

?'•".•:

'There are no significant differences in the estimates beyond 2020.

Table 5 Components of population growth since 1995, in absolute and
relative terms
Increase in population

Year

Standard
projection of
total population

2000

28,855,000

2025

43,172,000

2050

54,177,000

Population
increase
since 1995

since 1995 attributable to
Unwanted High desired
family size
fertility

Population
momentum

3,435,000

1,849,000

122,000

1,464,000

17,752,000

4,495,000

1,036,000

12,221,000

28,757,000

7,385,000

1,807,000

19,565,000

Period

Population
increase
since 1995
(percent)

Percent of future growth
attributable to
Unwanted High desired Population
momentum
family size
fertility

1995-2000

100

53.8

3.6

42.6

1995-2025

100

25.3

5.8

68.8

1995-2050

100

25.7

6.3

68.0

'S

placement scenarios estimates the contribution of high desired fer
tility; and the increase in population size between 1995 and 2050
in the replacement scenario estimates the contribution of popula
tion momentum.
According to the standard projection, the population will in
crease by 3.4 million between 1995 and 2000, by 17.8 million be
tween 1995 and 2025, and by 28.8 million between 1995 and
2050. Of the growth between 1995 and 2000, 54 percent is attrib
utable to unwanted fertility, 4 percent to high desired family size,

and 42 percent to population momentum. The role of population
momentum increases as the projection period lengthens, and by
2050 it is responsible for 68 percent of the growth since 1995, com
pared with just 26 percent for unwanted fertility and 6 percent for
high desired family size.
This result points to the critical impact of population momentum,
an issue that has thus far been relatively neglected. Integrated policies
and programs are therefore needed to address the three issues in a
concerted manner.

Implications for Future Population Policies
The projections just presented underscore the fact that, despite the
ongoing fertility transition, Kenya's population will increase from the
current estimate of 25 million to 29 million by the end of the century
and to 54 million by 2050. The emphasis on strengthening the family
planning program has been crucial to the fertility decline in the past
and will remain essential in the future. But this program alone will
not suffice to stabilize the population in the shortest possible time.
Other innovative and effective policy measures that squarely address
all three causes of population growth will also be required.

Reducing unwanted fertility
The 1989 and 1993 Demographic and Health Surveys (NCPD 1989,
1994) have indicated a high unmet need for family planning services in
Kenya. Over a third of the women interviewed in 1993 said that they
wanted either to stop or space their childbearing but were not practicing
contraception. The major causes for this unmet need were related to lack
of knowledge, fear of side effects, disapproval of husbands, and poor ser
vices at service delivery points. Inadequate involvement of men in
family planning programs has particularly undermined their poten
tially supportive role and has reduced communication between part
ners on matters pertaining to unwanted fertility. Family planning
services have been directed mainly at women. These issues under
score the need to strengthen family planning program as follows:
First, family planning programs in Kenya have remained mostly
clinic-based with limited coverage of the population. Current efforts
to expand the community-based distribution system represent a step
in the right direction and should be extended and enhanced in terms
of efficiency and self-sustainability.

Second, various information, education, and communication
(EEC) programs should be improved and made culturally sensitive in
order to reach a majority of the eligible population. In particular,
there is an urgent need to extend programs to men and adolescents,
.-.. < -•>
. •.;•. .-. »
who are currently underserved.
Third, the problem of poor-quality services needs to be addressed
by supplying a variety of effective contraceptive methods, training
. .
personnel adequately, and providing proper physical facilities.

Reducing the demand for large families

.

Although recent studies have documented a decline in the number of
children desired by women, from 7.3 around 1980 to 3.7 in 1993,
acceleration of this trend toward lower fertility deserves special policy
consideration.
Improvement in the educational attainment of the population,
particularly of women, can be instrumental in reducing fertility pref
erences. Censuses and demographic surveys in many developing
countries have documented that women with secondary-level and
higher education have consistently lower fertility and lower familysize preferences than those with only primary-level education or
none at all. Education not only empowers women to demand and
exercise their reproductive health rights, but it also enhances their
ability to participate actively in deciding upon the desired number of
children on an equal footing with men. Educated women also tend to
be the ones who effectively gain access to family planning services.
Women's current involvement in informal-sector and agricultural
activities as their main source of income needs to be enhanced by ex
amining the impact of existing policies on their access to credit facili
ties and returns on their labor. Women's involvement in modern-sec
tor activities can also lower the desired number of children. These
economic measures have the potential of improving women's eco
nomic security and independence. Gender-sensitive policies are there
fore needed to promote women's access to economic resources (e.g.,
credit) and modern-sector employment opportunities, which at the
moment are the domain of men. If well conceived and implemented,
such policies may encourage women to forego higher fertility for eco
nomic advancement.
Children have traditionally been perceived as assets to parents in
old age due to the lack of guaranteed economic security. This parental
expectation is profoundly entrenched in society, regardless of the de
cline in both achieved and desired fertility (Dow et al. 1994). But in

recent years, structural adjustment programs and adverse economic con
ditions have increased the cost of bearing and rearing children, resulting
in a further reduction in desired family size. It is therefore important that
this initiative to curtail fertility is sustained by appropriate socioeconomic policies that should neither hinder children's access to educa
tion nor provide incentives for parents to revert back to high fertility.

Reducing the impact of population momentum
The problem posed by the impact of population momentum on future
population growth is a complex and intriguing one to many policymakers because there is little experience with relevant programmatic
interventions.
One approach to reducing momentum is to raise both the age at
marriage and age at first birth. Some increase in the average age at
marriage may be achieved through legislation. However, this ap
proach has its limitations because it threatens the primacy of religious
and customary laws in this area. Its implementation might thus be
difficult and socially disruptive. An alternative and preferable option
is to promote female education beyond the primary level. Prolonging
girls' stay in school can have a positive impact on age at marriage and
female social status.
Another option is to inculcate the norms of responsible sexual be
havior and small family size when educating the adolescents on
whom future fertility trends will depend. Adolescents should be given
information on reproductive health and family planning issues and
be offered access to reproductive health and family planning services
to assist them in avoiding early pregnancies. The implementation
of family-life education in schools is of paramount importance in
this regard.

Recommendations
This study has underscored the challenges Kenya is likely to confront
as it attempts to reduce the rate of population growth and ultimately
to achieve population stabilization. Kenya's population is projected to
more than double by the year 2050 in spite of the ongoing fertility
transition. Unwanted fertility and population momentum are envis
aged to be the primary forces propelling this growth. Population mo
mentum alone is projected to contribute 19.6 million people to future
growth, which represents two-thirds of the total increase.
10

Appropriate population and socioeconomic policies will have to
be formulated to address the adverse effects of unwanted fertility and
population momentum on future wellbeing. The key policy areas to
be considered encompass:
{1) Strengthening family planning programs by improving cover
age and the quality of the services and by providing adequate
information, education, and communication to eliminate cur
rent and future unmet need. Male involvement in family
planning should be enhanced. This is expected to promote
spousal communication and decisionmaking.
(2) Integrating maternal-child health and family planning ser
vices so that women coming for MCH services are referred to
family planning service delivery points and vice versa. The
two programs should be mutually reinforcing in order to
yield optimum results.
(3) Enhancing female education beyond the primary level with a
view to promoting women's participation in socioeconomic
activities and in decisions that affect their reproductive health
.......
rights and fertility. ' -••---•••(4) Devoting special attention to adolescents' sexual and repro
ductive health concerns. As future parents, they should be
availed every opportunity to receive appropriate reproductive
health information and services. This approach should pro
mote adolescents' internalization of responsible parenthood
and small-family preferences. However, the specific needs of
boys and girls should be accorded appropriate consideration
given the differences in their sexual behavior.
(5) Promoting gender equality in order to raise women's socioeconomic status, which in turn should assist the government
in lowering unwanted fertility. In this regard laws pertaining
to child support, particularly affiliation laws and those related
to female inheritance from their husbands, should be re
viewed to facilitate women's access to family property and to
provide incentives to men to reduce their fertility.

11

Appendix 1
Projected total population under three scenarios,
1990-2050
Standard scenario
Year

Males

Females

Total

1990

10,855,035

11,045,729

21,900,764

1995
2000

12,600,368
14,301,744

12,819,483

2005

25,419,851

2.98
2.54

47.0
40.0

14,553,216

28,854,960

2.11

35.0

2010

15,889,020
17,356,436

16,177,025
17,682,829

32,066,045
35,039,265

1.77
1.43

30.1
25.7

2015
2020

18,632,450
19,982,970

19,003,861
20,401,393

37,636,311
40,384,363

1.41
1.34

2025

21,352,467
22,654,276
23,811,918
24,895,577

24,383,120
25,476,621

43,172,230
45,827,473
48,195,038
50,372,198

1.19

2030
2035
2040

21,819,763
23,173,197

21.7
21.4
20.5

1.01
0.88
0.75

2045

25,837,865

2050

26,745,815

26,465,359
27,413,506

52,303,224
54,177,321

0.70
0.70

Crude
Growth
birth rate
rate
(percent) (per 1,000)

Wanted scenario

12

Crude
Growth
birth rate
rate
(percent) (per 1,000)

19.1
17.6
16.0
15.2
14.7

Year

Males

Females

Total

1990

10,855,035

11,045,729

21,900,764

1995
2000

12,600,368
13,375,494

12,819,483

25,419,851

2005
2010

14,529,587

13,630,908
14,821,414

27,006,402
29,351,001

15,747,591

16,077,417

31,825,008

1.47

25.3
24.3

2015
2020

16.936,397

17,309,407

34,245,804

1.30

22.5

18,067,854

18,484,551

36,552,405

1.13

20.7

2025
2030

19,569,012
20,574,721

38,676,538
40,639,350

0.99
0.84

18.8
17.5

2035

19,107,526
20,064,629
20,912,562

2040
2045
2050

21,727,119
22,417,781
23,060,363

21,472,093
22,300,867
23,036,533
23,731,366

42,384,655
44,027,986
45,454,314
46,791,729

0.76
0.64

16.5
15.5

0.58
0.58

14.9
14.4

2.98
1.21
1.67
1.62

47.0
40.1
20.8

Replacement scenario

Crude
Growth
birth rate
rate
(percent) (per 1,000)

Year

Males

Females

Total

1990
1995

10,855,035

11,045,729

21,900,764

12,600,368

12,819,483

25,419,851

3,34
2.98

2000

13,314,097

2005
2015

14,232,100
15,322,926
16,495,259

13,569,772
14,525,135
15,654,127
16,869,176

2020

17,606,186

2025

18,590,098

2030

19,457,010

2035
2045

20,217,843
20,951,664
21,573,612

18,023,138
19,050,826
19,965,513
20,775,107
21,524,498
22,191,490

2050

22,158,101

22,827,203

26,883,869
28,757,235
30,977,053
33,364,435
35,629,324
37,640,924
39,422,523
40,992,950
42,476,162
43,765,102
44,985,304

1.12
1,35
1.49
1.48
1.31
1.10
0.92
0.78
0.71
0.60
0.55

2010

2040

47.0

40.1
19.8
21.9
22.9
22.8

-

:
•
:

•

20.9
18.6
17.0
16.1
15.2
14.7
14.4

Appendix 2
Projected primary school-going population under three
scenarios, 199O-205O
Standard scenario
Year

Males

Females

Total

1990
1995

2,940,225
3,250,950

2000
2005
2010

3,515,775
3,747,986
3,699,135
3,586,409
3,375,956
3,298,479
3,517,769 _
3,602,255
3,596,047
3,521,502
3,451,703

2,905,121
3,220,024
3,499,311
3,743,409
3,693,951
3,578,230
3,364,497
3,284,372
3,498,687
3,577,490
3,563,245
3,481,642
3,408,590

5,845,346
6,470,974
7,015,086
7,419,395
7,393,086
7,164,639
6,740,453
6,582,851
7,016,456
7,179,745
7,159,292
7,003,144
6,860,293

2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050

.
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Wanted scenario
Year

Males

Females

1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050

2,940,225
3,250,950
3,515,775
3,179,635
2,231,957
3,010,767
2,965,423
3,060,381
2,990,902
2,964,065
2,947,000
2,950,880
2,938,448

2,905,121
3,220,024
3,499,311
3,175,862
2,228,930
3,003,559
2,955,349
3,047,279
2,974,796
2,943,689
2,920,117
2,917,414
2,901,751

Total
' r

5,845,346
6,470,974
7,015,086
6,355,497
4,460,887
6,014,326
5,920,772
6,107,660
5,965,698
5,907,754
5,867,117
5,868,294
5,840,199

Replacement scenario
Year

Males

Females

Total

1990
1995

2,940,225
3,250,950
3,515,775
3,142,016
2,007,265
2,651,551
2,812,237
3,020,655
2,922,010
2,830,619
2,768,321
2,791,218
2,794,074

2,905,121
3,220,024
3,499,311
3,138,291
2,004,611
2,645,136
2,802,616
3,007,720
2,906,301
2,811,187
2,743,079
2,759,545
2,759,185

5,845,346
6,470,974
7,015,086
6,280,307
4,011,876
5,296,687
5,614,853
6,028,375
5,828,311
5,641,806
5,511,400
5,550,763
5,553,259

2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
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Appendix 3
Projected potential labor force under three scenarios,
-....199O-205O
Standard scenario
Year

Males

Females

Total

5,238,207
6,450,114
7,808,917
9,214,913
10,766,983
12,236,146
13,567,732
14,691,166
15,534,402
16,403,084
17,190,709

5,468,014
6,671,911
8,045,333
9,466,729
11,046,606
12,557,571
13,931,977
15,092,541
15,898,598

10,706,221
13,122,025
15,854,250
18,681,642
21,813,589
24,793,717
27,499,709
29,783,707
31,433,000
33,104,151
34,646,857
35,772,991
36,527,235

1990 '
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050

17,756,614
18,136,640

16,701,067
17,456,148
18,016,377
18,390,595

Wanted scenario
Year

Males

1990
1995

5,238,207
6,450,114
7,808,917
9,214,913
10,766,983
11,363,990
12,265,195
13,146,598
13,907,087
14,565,493

2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050

15,021,714
15,243,035
15,319,205

Females
5,845,346
6,671,911
8,045,333
9,466,729
11,046,606
11,684,694
12,624,799
13,537,603
14,255,519
14,843,486
15,269,316
15,483,587
15,546,005

Total
11,083,553
13,122,025
15,854,250
18,681,642
21,813,589
23,048,684
24,889,994
26,684,201
28,162,606
29,408,979
30,291,030
30,726,622
30,865,210

Growth
rate
(percent)
4.1

3.8
3.3
3.1
2.6
2.1
1.6
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.6
0.4

!r

"

Growth
rate
(percent)
3.4
3.8
3.3
3.1
1.1
1.5
1.4
1.1
0.9
0.6
0.3
<0.3

Replacement scenario
Year
1990
1995
2000

2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050

Males

Females

Total

Growth
rate
(percent)

5,238,207
6,450,114

5,468,014
6,671,911

10,706,221
13,122,025

7,808,917
9,214,913

8,045,333
9,466,729

15,854,250
18,681,642

4.1
3.8
3.3

10,766,983
11,306,178
11,982,001

11,046,606
11,626,835

21,813,589
22,933,013

3.1
1.0

12,341,226

24,323,227

1.2

12,738,275
13,481,981

13,127,806

25,866,081
27,309,379
28,516,758

1.2

14,121,531
14,521,437
14,652,087
14,641,365

13,827,398
14,395,227
14,765,193
14,888,834
14,863,103

29,286,630
29,540,921

1.1
0.9
0.5
<0.5

29,504,468

<0.5
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